Relationship building, coaching and educating clients are often invisible traits but should be part of the conversation when seeking out a TPA. Additional SmartSheet topics are available on the Educational Resources page.
What is a TPA? Are there Benefits of hiring a TPA? Download PDF. Over time, however, trade negotiations have become more complex. Congress also has insisted on tighter oversight and consultation requirements, and the trade debate has become more partisan in nature, making congressional renewal of TPA more controversial. TPA is the product of many decades of debate, cooperation, and compromise between Congress and the executive branch.
At its foundation lie the respective constitutional powers granted to Congress and the President, as well as the pragmatic realization that a certain cooperative flexibility is needed if the United States is to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements credibly.
The evolution of TPA to date shows, among other things, that the congressional-executive partnership on trade policymaking can be strengthened or strained as it adjusts to evolving political and economic conditions, as well as shifting priorities of the two branches. The U. Constitution assigns express authority over the regulation of foreign trade to Congress. Article I, Section 8, gives Congress the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations Both legislative and executive authorities come into play in the development and execution of U.
For roughly the first years of the United States, Congress exercised its authority over foreign trade by setting tariff rates on all imported products. The tariff was the main trade policy instrument and primary source of federal revenue. Early congressional trade debates pitted Members from northern manufacturing regions, who benefitted from protectionist tariffs, against those from largely southern commodity exporting regions, who advocated low tariffs.
During this period, the President's primary role in setting trade policy was to use his foreign affairs authority to negotiate, bring into force, and implement with the advice and consent of the Senate general bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation. These treaties "included a U.
Two legislative events occurred in the s that radically changed the shape and conduct of U. The act led to retaliatory tariffs by major U. The damaging effects of Smoot-Hawley prompted the second major trade legislative event in the s. The RTAA authorized the President to enter into reciprocal trade agreements that reduced tariffs within pre-approved levels. The tariffs were applied on an MFN basis. Under the RTAA, Congress authorized the President to implement the new tariffs by proclamation without additional legislation.
The RTAA is important for several reasons:. Congress renewed presidential reciprocal trade agreements authority for tariff reductions 11 times until through trade agreement extension acts see Appendix A. General tariff levels declined and their significance as a trade barrier diminished. Under the Trade Expansion Act of , Congress granted the President authority for five years to enter into agreements that negotiated the reduction or elimination of tariffs.
The act also expanded Congress's role in the negotiating process by requiring the President to submit for congressional review a copy of each concluded agreement and a presidential statement explaining why the agreement was necessary.
It allowed the President to conclude the GATT Kennedy Round , the last round in which tariff reduction was the primary focus of trade negotiations. Along with a number of tariff reduction agreements, which were covered by the congressional trade agreements authority, the GATT member countries reached agreements in the Kennedy Round in two areas related to nontariff barriers NTBs , that is, laws and rules other than tariffs that are used to restrict imports.
The first was a customs valuation agreement that would have required the United States to eliminate the American Selling Price method of pricing goods at the border. The second was an antidumping agreement that would have required changes in U.
In fact, Congress passed a resolution in instructing the Johnson Administration against negotiating "nontariff commitments. The results of the Kennedy Round made evident that changes in nontariff barrier rules would increasingly dominate the agenda of future multilateral trade agreements, which would also require changes in U. Concern over presidential encroachment on its legislative authority prompted Congress to seek a legislative remedy.
The tariff modification authority in the Trade Expansion Act of expired on July 1, , but Congress did not renew the authority for seven years as it debated legislative options. As before, the act provided the President with the authority to enter into trade agreements that reduced or eliminated tariffs within certain predefined parameters. To address the critical issue of agreements that required changes in U. Some in Congress, however, argued that subjecting implementing legislation to ordinary congressional debate and amendment procedures would defeat a major purpose for delegating trade agreements authority to the President in the first place—to reduce the special interest pressures inherent in trade policymaking.
Many Members also recognized an important potential problem: that U. The Committee recognizes Our negotiators cannot be expected to accomplish the negotiating goals Our trading partners have expressed an unwillingness to negotiate without some assurances that the Congress will consider the agreements within a definite time-frame. As a solution, Congress agreed that each chamber would suspend its ordinary legislative procedures and give trade agreements expedited treatment.
The relevant committees would be given limited time to consider implementing bills. Once they reached the floor, the implementing bills would be subject to time-limited debate and no amendments.
In exchange, Congress required the executive branch to consult with relevant committees during the negotiations and to notify Congress 90 calendar days before signing an agreement.
The act also provided for the accreditation of 10 Members of Congress as advisers to the U. The Trade Act of had provided for five such advisers. These provisions rounded out what would become commonly known as "fast track trade negotiating authority. As expected, this round resulted in a number of agreements on NTBs, such as government procurement practices, product standards, customs regulations, and rules for administering antidumping and countervailing duty procedures.
The resulting Trade Agreements Act of P. The expedited legislative procedures have not changed since first enacted in These provisions are ensconced in Sections of the Trade Act of , as amended, and are not subject to sunset provisions. The ability to use them, however, is subject to time limits, and Congress has revised them over the years.
The next section of this report examines these procedures and trade agreements authority in more detail. The initial grant of "fast track trade negotiating authority" and the authority to enact tariff modifications by proclamation under the Trade Act of were in effect for five years ending on January 2, Congress extended a residual presidential authority to proclaim tariff modifications to January 2, Along with implementing the Tokyo Round agreements, the Trade Agreements Act of extended for eight years, until January 2, , the presidential authority to enter into agreements on nontariff barriers, but made no other changes to the original authority.
The act did not extend presidential tariff modification authority. This act amended the Trade Act of by adding trade agreements authority that provided for the "negotiation" and implementation of bilateral free trade agreements that both reduced or eliminated tariffs and addressed nontariff barriers. Congress was taking into account the U. The legislation waived for the U. However, for negotiations with other countries, it required the President to notify the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees of his intention to begin FTA negotiations 60 days prior to entering the negotiations and provided for denial of expedited procedures if either committee disapproved of the negotiation within 60 days after receiving the notification.
The act also required that agreements that led to tariff modifications beyond a certain threshold be subject to congressional approval via implementing legislation. The OTCA, an extensive trade bill that addressed numerous areas of trade policy, extended the President's authority to enter into trade agreements before June 1, , but extended the application of expedited procedures only for agreements entered into before June 1, Legislation for agreements entered into after that date, but before June 1, , could be approved under the expedited procedures, if the President requested an extension of such authority and it was not disapproved by either the House or the Senate.
The President requested the extension, which survived proposed House and Senate resolutions of disapproval. The OTCA also provided that Congress could withhold a trade agreement from fast track consideration by passing a resolution of disapproval, if it determined that the United States Trade Representative USTR had failed to consult with Congress adequately during the trade negotiations.
Multilateral negotiations under the Uruguay Round of the GATT, however, did not conclude in time to meet the June 1, , expiration deadline. In response, Congress passed H.
The votes reflected strong congressional support in the House and in the Senate The law did not change any other aspects of the fast track authority. After the trade agreements authority expired on April 16, , Congress did not approve new authority until the Trade Act of H.
The eight-year period was the longest hiatus since fast track was initially approved in In , both the Senate Finance and the House Ways and Means Committees reported out legislation to renew fast track.
House Republican leaders pulled it before a floor vote at the request of the Clinton Administration because it lacked sufficient support in the House. In September , the House voted on fast track authority legislation, but the bill failed to pass Several reasons may explain Congress's decision not to enact new trade agreements authority for the Clinton Administration. For one, although both the Republican congressional leadership and the Clinton Administration supported fast track authority, the two sides could not agree on the negotiating objectives for labor and environmental issues under the proposed renewed authority.
In general, Republicans wanted more limited coverage than the Clinton Administration and many Democrats in Congress preferred. In addition, the WTO successor to the GATT failed to launch a new round of negotiations at the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle, and therefore, no major trade negotiations were underway that might have made renewal of trade agreements authority a political priority.
In , President George W. Bush requested a renewal of fast track authority. It was renamed in the legislation as "trade promotion authority TPA ," in part to counter what many viewed as a negative connotation associated with the term fast track.
The structure of TPA was consistent with previous trade agreements authority. It included new language for labor and environmental provisions, defining them as "principal negotiating objectives. The act also created a new mechanism for congressional consultation, the Congressional Oversight Group COG , to operate in addition to the congressional trade advisors that were appointed under previous versions.
A more detailed discussion of the notification and consultation requirements appears in the next section. It passed 66 to The conference report on the final bill, H.
It contains updated negotiating objectives on trade in goods, services, agriculture especially in the area of sanitary and phytosanitary standards , intellectual property rights, regulatory practices, and on digital trade in goods and services. The negotiating objectives adopt the May 10, , Understanding provisions on labor and the environment, and they adopt new provisions on currency manipulation, localization, state-owned enterprises, and human rights.
If enacted, TPA will expire on July 1, , provided an extension disapproval resolution is not introduced and passed by either chamber by July 1, see below. TPA may be used to consider potential agreements resulting from several ongoing negotiations, including.
It may also be used to consider any agreement resulting from the Doha Round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations. These four goals, and some important procedural precedents that fall outside the formal legal TPA process, are examined below. As discussed above, when the statutory authority to enter into trade agreements was limited to reducing tariffs, the trade agreement was implemented by presidential proclamation and without further congressional action, provided the tariff rate reductions were within legislatively pre-approved limits.
This process changed when trade negotiations were expanded to include nontariff barriers NTBs. These more complex agreements requiring changes to domestic law led Congress to tighten its control over trade agreements negotiation and implementation by establishing "fast track trade negotiating authority.
At the heart of what is now called TPA are the expedited procedures for moving trade implementing legislation through Congress Section of the Trade Act of —see below , which have been used for nearly all reciprocal trade agreements. The bill qualifies only if certain conditions are met. First, the trade agreement entered into must make progress in meeting TPA's negotiating objectives, and the President must satisfy the notification and consultation requirements of the TPA statute see below.
Second, the implementing bill must contain provisions that approve the agreement and the statement of administrative action, and contain only those other provisions changing laws "necessary or appropriate" to implement the agreement "either repealing or amending existing laws or providing new statutory authority". Importantly, Congress has been explicit that the expedited procedures "are enacted as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House and the Senate, with the recognition of the right of either House to change the rules at any time.
In a trade implementing bill, Congress conveys to the President the authority to provide for the agreement to enter into force by presidential proclamation, after determining that the partner country ies has taken measures necessary to comply with the provisions of the agreement. The requirements of this authority are defined in Section of the Trade Act of see Appendix B for TPA timeline under which an agreement may enter into force "if and only if":.
Should the above requirements be fulfilled to the satisfaction of Congress, it has agreed to follow certain expedited legislative procedures as defined in Sections of the Trade Act of , as amended. In effect, these rules require that Congress must act on the bill sent over by the White House, and in other ways represent a significant departure from ordinary legislative procedures.
The major rules are listed below see Appendix C for greater detail :. Congress exercises its trade policy role, in part, by defining trade negotiation objectives in TPA legislation. Through the negotiating objectives, Congress has made clear that trade is an important aspect of U.
To take the fullest advantage of these benefits, Congress, drawing on its constitutional authority and historical precedent, defined the objectives that the President is to pursue in trade negotiations. Although the executive branch has some discretion over implementing these goals, they are definitive statements of U. For this reason, trade negotiating objectives stand at the center of the congressional debate on TPA. Congress establishes trade negotiating objectives in three categories: 1 overall objectives; 2 principal objectives; and 3 other priorities.
These begin with broad goals that encapsulate the "overall" direction trade negotiations are expected to take, such as enhancing U.
Principal objectives are more specific and provide detailed goals that Congress expects to be integrated into trade agreements, such as reducing barriers and distortions to trade e. Objectives also include an important obligation to consult Congress, discussed in detail below.
In the past, language defining trade negotiating objectives has been contested, contributing to the renewal controversy in which TPA passed largely along partisan lines and by the narrowest of margins in the House.
This controversy reflects the importance that TPA negotiating objectives can play as a template for future trade agreements negotiated under these guidelines. For example, if the language of a TPA objective is highly contentious, the same issue may prove controversial when a specific trade agreement is brought before Congress for approval using that same or similar language.
The labor provisions, which are emphasized in all three groups of negotiating objectives, provide the best illustration. The trade agreements authority is extended to the President provided he or his designee consults regularly with Congress.
This requirement includes consultation with the Congressional Advisory Groups CAG in both chambers, created in TPA, whose members are accredited as official advisors to the trade negotiation delegations. The timing of these notifications is detailed in the timeline presented in Appendix B. Moreover, high-standard agreements encourage countries outside U.
And that helps American businesses and workers compete better globally. USTR has consulted hundreds of times with Congressional committees with jurisdiction over international trade negotiations, consistently requesting input on the direction, focus, and content of TPP negotiations. And USTR continually meets with Members and staff from other committees regarding particular issues of interest.
In addition to our congressionally mandated committees of industry and public sector advisers , the United States consults with all interested stakeholders at each trade agreement negotiating round and in between. We do this to share information and get views that make the negotiated product better. For TPP, these stakeholders have included representatives from academia, labor unions, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations.
Under TPA, this activity would continue and be strengthened. Skip to main content.
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