After early rebel gains, Qaddafi had seized the advantage. Still, he was not in a position to deal a decisive blow to the opposition. Nowhere in the Arab Spring era has one side in a military conflict been able to claim a clear victory, even with massive advantages in manpower, equipment, and regional backing. Any Libyan who had opted to take up arms was liable to be captured, arrested, or killed if Qaddafi "won," so the incentives to accept defeat were nonexistent, to say nothing of the understandable desire to not live under the rule of a brutal and maniacal strongman.
The most likely outcome, then, was a Syria-like situation of indefinite, intensifying violence. And so there would be more death, more disruption, more destruction. In Libya, the U. In Syria, the U. The problem here is that US intervention did not , in fact, result in a costly disaster, unless we are using the word "result" to simply connote that one thing happened after a previous thing. The current civil war in Libya began in May — a full two and a half years later.
To argue that the current conflict in Libya is a result of the intervention, one would basically need to assume that the outbreak of civil war was inevitable, irrespective of anything that happened in the intervening 30 months. This combination exacerbated tribal and regional divisions while making power sharing even more difficult. Finally, the US could have restrained its allies, particularly the Gulf States and Egypt, from excessive meddling in the lead-up to and early days of the civil war.
Yet Libya quickly tumbled off the American agenda. Libya "was farmed out to the working level," according to Dennis Ross , who served as a special assistant to President Obama until November There was also an assumption that the Europeans would do more. This was more than just a hope; it was an organizing principle of Obama administration engagement abroad.
Analysts Nina Hachigian and David Shorr have called it the "Responsibility Doctrine" : a strategy of "prodding other influential nations … to help shoulder the burdens of fostering a stable, peaceful world order. This may be the way the world should operate, but as a set of driving assumptions, this part of the Obama doctrine has proven to be wrong at best, and rather dangerous at worst. The US, when it came to Libya, did not meet this minimal standard. Even President Obama himself would eventually acknowledge the failure to stay engaged.
In other words, even this "worst-case scenario" falls well short of actual worst-case scenarios. According to the Libya Body Count, around 4, people have so far been killed over the course of 22 months of civil war. But the episode soured U. The fighting led to the closure of foreign embassies in Tripoli in July and August , as the United States, Britain, France, and others moved their diplomatic missions to Tunisia.
In subsequent years, the United States focused its attention narrowly on combating an emerging terror threat, launching air and drone strikes against members of al Qaeda and the Islamic State, which had secured footholds in Libya amid the chaos. Other countries have gradually returned to Tripoli—including Italy, Britain, and even Egypt, which backs a rebellious leader in the east.
But the United States has decided to stay in Tunis. Haftar, who holds dual U. Portraying his cause as a bulwark against Islamists, Haftar found powerful foreign backers, including Russia and the United Arab Emirates, who have violated a U. On April 4, , the same day U. On Tuesday, a U. But any illusions of a swift military victory were thwarted as Turkey entered the fray, supplying the U. The panel detailed nearly 20 transfers of weapons and materiel—including surface-to-air missiles, frigates, and armed drones—from Turkey to Libya over the same time period in support of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord.
The panel also linked Erik Prince, a private security entrepreneur and donor to Trump, to a botched operation to provide armed groups associated with Haftar with an array of military services and equipment. The scheme, dubbed Project Opus, was intended to help Haftar attack sea lanes used to transport weapons from Turkey to forces loyal to the U.
The operation planners initially sought to purchase surplus military equipment from Jordan, but the Jordanian government blocked the deal. They then turned to a series of companies allegedly owned by Prince, who sold the team several utility helicopters, a light attack aircraft, and surveillance aircraft, according to the report.
A spokesperson from the Russian mission to the U. In October , a Libyan military commission with officers from both sides of the conflict brokered a cease-fire that called for all foreign fighters to leave the country and backed U. What is required, he said, is that Libya form a new national identity where a professional military vows loyalty to a new civilian government. The United States, he said, could play a critical role in promoting that kind of reform. But in the end, the Libyans will have to get their own house in order.
But Williams said Libya could still use help from Washington. Colum Lynch is a senior staff writer at Foreign Policy. Twitter: columlynch. The problem is my black skin; the thuwwar think I am with Colonel al-Gaddafi. These reports illustrate that while NATO may have been actively engaging the Gaddafi regime militarily, the organisation failed in the protection of the Libyan people, and therefore failed to adequately intervene under Responsibility to Protect. This further emphasises the proposition that not only did NATO fail to intervene in Libya on the sole purpose of Responsibility to Protect, it also failed to adequately cover all aspects of Responsibility to Protect doctrine without discriminating against the Libyans who suffered under rebel rule.
These false statements were confirmed in a Pentagon press conference:. Do you see any evidence that he [Gaddafi] actually fired on his own people from the air? This is a crucial issue in evaluating why NATO decided to intervene.
It certainly casts doubt on the premise that it was under the principle of Responsibility to Protect and subsequently it is clear that there was hyperbole in the reporting of the uprisings in Libya. Although NATO may have had the initial goal of protecting civilians, there is a substantial amount of evidence that suggests that the intervention was focused on regime change.
This is very apparent from some of the military actions that NATO authorised and executed. This was seen as largely unjustified, as the Gaddafi military posed a negligible threat to the local population as the local residents were supporting of the Gaddafi regime [21] ,and therefore was tactical decision focused on dismantling the manpower of the Libyan army, rather than the welfare of the Libyan people. The extent of the airstrikes that NATO committed in the intervention should be noted.
This sheer volume of missile strikes underlines the attention that was given in crippling the Libyan military, which would successively permit regime change to occur. This would limit accidental engagements on innocents, which would be crucial for a rebellion attempting to gain the support of the local civilian population.
The NATO backing of rebel groups was also problematic due to the hidden intentions of certain rebels. Although a ceasefire would have the potential to open communication between the warring sides and limit further violence against civilians, NATO did not openly support the ceasefire. This is controversial, especially in response to a ceasefire, as, if accepted, it would provide relief for the Libyan civilians affected by the civil war.
Subsequently this would parallel with the objectives of Responsibility to Protect. S National Security and African development, [37] was the foundation for this American initiative. To conclude, the NATO intervention in Libya was extremely controversial due to its failure in outlining what the true objectives were. Although the intervention was framed under Responsibility to Protect, it is clear that regime change was the priority for NATO—though it does not follow from this that NATO failed to protect the Libyan population in its entirety.
However, this alteration of mission objectives questions the legitimacy of the intervention, and of NATO itself. Koenig, A. Hiding in plain sight — the pursuit of war criminals from nuremberg to the.
Oakland: University of California Press, p. The ethics of humanitarian intervention in Libya. Ali Zway and K. Kuperman, A. CrossRef Google Scholar. Lambroschini, A. Levinson, C. Lynch, C.
Lyons, J. Malye, F. McGreal, C. Miller, G. Milne, S. Nakhoul, S. Nordland, R. Nossiter, A. Pelham, N. Pileggi, T.
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